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INTRODUCTION
Many of Richard Posner’s opinions boldly confront great
questions.1 But equally important are those that, in the aggregate, illuminate discrete areas of the law and make them easier
to understand. Among the best examples are Posner’s some two
dozen opinions on promissory estoppel.2 They illustrate his ability
to reshape the terms of even the most familiar debates.
By the middle of the twentieth century, the idea took hold
that, in addition to promises supported by consideration, promises seriously made and reasonably relied on were also legally enforceable.3 It was not easy, however, to reconcile this idea with
traditional notions of contract law. It was not just that traditional
contract law enforced only promises that were part of a
bargained-for exchange. It was hard to hold both that all promises
seriously made and reasonably relied on should be enforceable
and still accept the statute of frauds, the parol evidence rule, and
other doctrines governing contract creation and enforcement. All
of these have the effect of limiting the enforceability of promises
on which people reasonably relied.
It seemed possible that promissory estoppel would displace
traditional contract law entirely. Liability would lie for careless
speech as it does for any other careless act. Broken promises
would become folded into a more general category of civil wrongs.

† Harry A. Bigelow Distinguished Service Professor, The University of Chicago Law
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1
See generally, for example, Baskin v Bogan, 766 F3d 648 (7th Cir 2014) (striking
down state bans on same-sex marriages).
2
See generally, for example, Cosgrove v Bartolotta, 150 F3d 729 (7th Cir 1998); Miller
v Taylor Insulation Co, 39 F3d 755 (7th Cir 1994).
3
See Joel M. Ngugi, Promissory Estoppel: The Life History of an Ideal Legal
Transplant, 41 U Rich L Rev 425, 433–37 (2007).
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This was the theme of Professor Grant Gilmore’s The Death of
Contract.4 At the end of this short monograph, however, Gilmore
holds out hope that someone might appear and restore order:
We have witnessed the dismantling of the formal system of
the classical theorists. We have gone through our romantic
agony—an experience peculiarly unsettling to people intellectually trained and conditioned as lawyers are. It may be
that . . . [someone new] is already waiting in the wings to
summon us back to the paths of righteousness, discipline, order, and well-articulated theory. Contract is dead—but who
knows what unlikely resurrection the Easter-tide may
bring?5
Gilmore had little inkling that one of his own colleagues at The
University of Chicago, working just a few doors away, was indeed
waiting in the wings.
When interpreting the common law, Posner often sat in diversity. Far from wrestling with first principles, his task was to
guess what another court would do if confronted with the same
issue. He was not in a position to introduce striking new ideas or
boldly reshape existing law. Nevertheless, Posner was in a position to harmonize various strands of existing doctrine. The cumulative effect of Posner’s many opinions on promissory estoppel
was to domesticate the doctrine within the realm of traditional
contract law.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
At common law, a promise, without more, was not legally enforceable—and for good reason.6 When a judge issues a judgment
and awards money damages, it is not just so much talk. The judgment entitles the prevailing party to a writ of execution, an order
that compels the sheriff to seize property of the defendant.7 Allowing a private actor to call on the coercive hand of the king was
serious business.
People, of course, should keep their promises. But that was
not the question. The question rather was whether a breach of a
particular promise was important enough that the king needed to
4

Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract (Ohio State 1974).
Id at 103.
6
See John P. Dawson, et al, Contracts: Cases and Comment 203 (Foundation 10th
ed 2013).
7
Douglas G. Baird, Reconstructing Contracts 55–56 (Harvard 2013).
5
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intervene. As between commercial actors, the rationale is
straightforward enough. The king has an interest in ensuring
that markets work. But what other kinds of promises rose to a
level that justified the use of force? Common law lawyers took this
question seriously.
Early on, common law lawyers distinguished promises that
were enforceable from those that were not by asserting that the
former were supported by “consideration,” while the latter were
not.8 Sometimes consideration was made synonymous with the
causa that continental lawyers believed would make promises enforceable. There were other times when consideration was used
interchangeably with the familiar quid pro quo of debt. Other
times it was little more than a different way of saying that the
promise in question was one of those that courts had previously
found to be enforceable.9
When Professor Christopher Columbus Langdell and Oliver
Wendell Holmes attempted to formalize the law of contracts beginning in the early 1870s, they offered an account of contract law
that had hard edges.10 They insisted that consideration existed
only if there were a bargained-for exchange. For consideration to
exist, each party had to incur a detriment or bestow a benefit in
exchange for the promise received from the other.11
This account of positive law was something of an oversimplification.12 Nevertheless, during this era, the pronouncements of
Cambridge-based legal academics were to a large extent selffulfilling.13 The most prominent lawyers had been students at
Harvard or had learned the law from its alumni. So too the judges.
They believed the law to be what these professors said it was.
They argued their cases and issued their opinions accordingly.
Consideration required a bargained-for exchange because their
professors said it did.
8
For a somewhat more detailed account of this history, see John P. Dawson, et al,
Contracts at 203–06 (cited in note 6).
9
See id at 204–05.
10 C.C. Langdell, A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts (Little, Brown 1871);
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, The Common Law (Little, Brown 1881).
11 Holmes, Common Law at 293–94 (cited in note 10).
12 Courts in New York, for example, had long held that promises that were part of a
charitable subscription were supported by consideration even though there was no
bargained-for exchange. See generally, for example, Barnes v Perine, 12 NY 18 (1854).
13 With his edition of Kent’s Commentaries and his lectures on the common law,
Justice Holmes was at the intellectual center of this legal circle even though he served on
Harvard’s faculty for only a short time. See James Kent, Commentaries on American Law
1826–30 (Little, Brown 12th ed 1896) (Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, ed).
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Hence, one could set a change in the law in motion by persuading Professor Samuel Williston, Langdell’s successor as the
teacher of contracts at Harvard, to temper the assertion that the
only legally enforceable promises were those that were part of a
bargained-for exchange. Those who set about this task—in the
first instance Yale’s Professor Arthur Corbin—pointed to cases in
which courts had found promises to be legally enforceable yet not
part of a bargained-for exchange.14
There was no general doctrine that promises seriously made
and reasonably relied on were enforceable, but one could find
cases that pointed in this direction. A grandfather gave his granddaughter a promissory note so that she did not have to work.15
This led her to quit her job. But the grandfather died, and his
executor refused to honor the promissory note on the ground that
the promise was gratuitous and not supported by consideration.
The granddaughter sued the executor and won. The court found
that, by virtue of the reliance of the granddaughter, the executor
was estopped from raising the defense of absence of consideration.16
To reach this result, the court applied equitable estoppel in a
familiar way. The doctrine limits the ability of a party to enter an
otherwise meritorious pleading if the pleading was at odds with
that party’s past conduct. I reassure a co-owner of a business that
she can leave it for other ventures and not worry about the guarantee she has given me. Even if I do not formally waive the guarantee, my behavior keeps me from later suing her on the guarantee. Invoking the guarantee in court is inconsistent with telling
the promisor that she should pursue new ventures. The grandfather’s executor is similarly disabled from raising the absence of
consideration in the face of the grandfather telling his granddaughter that she could quit her job.
But equitable estoppel does not ineluctably lead to the enforcement of serious promises reasonably relied on as a general
matter. The holder of a promissory note, such as the granddaughter, is presumptively entitled to payment. To enforce a note, she
does not need to plead that the underlying promise was supported
by consideration. Absence of consideration is a defense that must
be pled by the person being sued on the note.17 Estoppel works in
14

See Gilmore, Death of Contract at 57–58 (cited in note 4).
See generally, for example, Ricketts v Scothorn, 77 NW 365 (Neb 1898).
16 Id at 367.
17 See, for example, UCC § 3-305(a)(2) (“[T]he right to enforce the obligation of a
party to pay an instrument is subject to . . . a defense of the obligor.”).
15
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the case of a negotiable instrument because the person who made
the promise and broke it rather than the person who relied on it
is the one who must plead absence of consideration. In the case of
an ordinary promise, the promisee must affirmatively plead the
presence of consideration. Estoppel does not enter the picture.
The beneficiary of the promise has to take the first step. Like
every plaintiff, she must be able to state a claim on which relief
can be granted. She cannot do this if the promise she seeks to
enforce is not part of a bargained-for exchange.
Nevertheless, armed with this case and others invoking other
doctrines, Corbin was able to persuade Williston and other members of the American Law Institute that there was a general principle at work. Reliance, in addition to consideration, sufficed to
make promises legally enforceable. And the evolution of the doctrine did not stop here. In the decades that followed the adoption
of the First Restatement of Contracts, promissory estoppel did not
simply make reliance an alternative to bargained-for consideration. It morphed into its own cause of action.
Accepting promissory estoppel as a stand-alone cause of action introduced difficulties. In the first instance, it lacks hard
edges. How exactly does one go about distinguishing what reliance is “reasonable”? Quite apart from the fuzziness of the doctrine, there was the question of what remained of traditional contract law if reliance alone triggered legal liability. What is the
need for the many ways in which the common law limits the enforceability of promises (such as the parol evidence rule or the
statute of frauds)?
This was the basic theme of The Death of Contract.18 Without
its formal rules, contract law loses its coherence as a distinct
branch of law and simply merges into tort law. Given the uncertain boundaries of “reasonable reliance,” judges and juries are
largely unconstrained. They are empowered to impose civil liability according to their own sense of what is fair when people fail to
keep their promises.
From the perspective of many mid-century contracts scholars, the death of contract was not such a bad thing.19 Courts ought

18 Gilmore, Death of Contract at 87 (cited in note 4) (“Speaking descriptively, we
might say that what is happening is that ‘contract’ is being reabsorbed into the mainstream of ‘tort.’”).
19 See, for example, Michael B. Metzger and Michael J. Phillips, The Emergence of
Promissory Estoppel as an Independent Theory of Recovery, 35 Rutgers L Rev 472, 557 (1983):
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to have the discretion to do the right thing to the extent justice
required it. The statute of frauds, the parol evidence rule, and
other hoary contract doctrines were technical rules that allowed
people who behaved badly to avoid responsibility for their actions.
Many cases in which parties invoke promissory estoppel are
ordinary disputes between business people that may not provide
a compelling case for legal reform.20 It was easy enough, however,
to find cases that made it easy to justify giving courts a general
power to enforce promises seriously made and reasonably relied
on. The facts of one notable case from the era illustrates. An insurance agent persuaded a young soldier to switch life insurance
companies, assuring him that the new company, like his existing
one, would cover him in the event he died in combat.21 The written
policy the company issued, however, excluded war risk.
The written policy was a completely integrated contract that,
on its face, set out all the obligations of both parties. Hence, under
traditional contract doctrine, the agent’s oral promise was not enforceable, and thus the beneficiaries of the policy were not entitled
to recover. The court found the promise enforceable nevertheless:
[T]his verdict recognized a duty of Prudential . . . to act in an
honorable and upright way in accordance with its agent’s
promise. Thus, application of promissory estoppel in no way
trammels upon the parol evidence rule. Involved here is a
separate enforceable promise and not a variance or modification of the terms of the policy.22

The judicial concern with pre-classical ideas of justice of which promissory estoppel is one expression has been on the rise throughout the twentieth century.
Moreover, it has roots in the social experience of this century. Barring a thoroughgoing return to laissez-faire ideas, that trend is likely to continue, and the
expansion of promissory estoppel should proceed apace.
20 Although promissory estoppel is frequently invoked when negotiations never ripen
into a final agreement, courts typically resist applying it in this context. See Alan
Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements, 120
Harv L Rev 661, 674–75 (2007). Promissory estoppel cases are most likely to be successful
when business people interact and there are discrete undertakings on the part of one or
the other without there being a formal agreement or the agreement itself being too indefinite to be enforceable as a traditional contract. See, for example, Cosgrove v Bartolotta,
150 F3d 729, 733 (7th Cir 1998) (holding that an investor could recover on a promissory
estoppel theory after reasonably relying on defendant restaurateur’s promise).
21 Prudential Insurance Co v Clark, 456 F2d 932, 934 (5th Cir 1972).
22 Id at 937. As it happens, Prudential could have been decided without reaching the
question of the relationship between promissory estoppel and the formal rules of contract.
It was a case in which the court might have relied entirely on traditional notions of equitable estoppel. Prudential had paid out on the policy and was suing to get its money back.
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The pull of such compelling cases obscures the potential cost of an
uncabined doctrine of promissory estoppel. It was all well and
good to dismiss Langdell’s belief that there was some inner ineluctable magic to the rules of contract, but it is another thing altogether to dismiss contract law’s formalities as useless.
The statute of frauds ensures that, in deals of any consequence, courts and juries will have the benefit of some writing
that evidences the transaction.23 Similarly, the parol evidence
rule forces the factfinder to focus on the written document.24 With
such rules in place, legal decisionmaking becomes cheaper and
less prone to error. Moreover, the existence of such legal rules
changes the dynamics of negotiations between the parties. I can
negotiate with you and explore possible deals without fearing that
what I say will trigger liability. Only when I sign a writing showing that we have reached a deal am I at risk of being bound. And
I am bound only to what the document says. I do not have to worry
that you misunderstood what I said during negotiations.
Such rules can make parties to contracts better off. I am willing to negotiate in a way that is more free-flowing and beneficial
for both parties.25 Once one accepts the possibility that contracts’
formal rules have virtues and should remain in place at least to
some extent, one needs some ability to cabin promissory estoppel.
But how exactly does one go about doing this?
Richard Posner confronted promissory estoppel in Economic
Analysis of Law even while Gilmore was writing The Death of
Contract. Posner noted that promissory estoppel was best conceived as a species of tort. As with other torts, the relevant question is “whether the imposition of liability will create incentives
for value-maximizing conduct in the future.”26
When my wealthy uncle carelessly promises to pay for my
college education and then refuses to keep it, it makes sense to
hold him liable if I gave up my part-time job as a result of the

It is easy to argue that, once having made the promise and kept it, Prudential was equitably estopped from using the court system to recover the money.
23 See Richard A. Lord, 9 Williston on Contracts § 21:1 (West 4th ed 2012).
24 See Richard A. Lord, 11 Williston on Contracts § 33:1 (West 4th ed 2012).
25 Legal scholars have long identified such benefits of formal rules. See, for example,
Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 Colum L Rev 799, 813 (1941) (“Business deals
can often emerge only from a converging series of negotiations. . . . To surround with rigid
legal sanctions even the first exploratory expressions of intention would not only introduce
an unpleasant atmosphere into business negotiations, but would actually hamper
commerce.”).
26 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 3.1 at 43 (Little, Brown 1973).
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promise. Given his promise, it was reasonable for me to rely on
the promise. The world is a better place if people make only promises they intend to keep. It allows the beneficiaries of these promises to rely on them. The law is a useful lever to use to induce
individuals to be careful when they make promises, just as it is a
useful way to give them an incentive to drive carefully. Individuals should act and speak in a way that takes account of the costs
that their actions have on others.
The rationale that Posner put forward in Economic Analysis
of Law was, however, made at a high level of abstraction. It is one
thing to assert that legal rules can induce parties to speak more
carefully, but such rules can also chill speech, especially when the
risk of error is taken into account. Gratuitous transfers often
come with backstories that are hard to understand. The potential
for legal liability may prevent some promises from being made in
the first instance. Even with commercial actors, it is not easy to
determine exactly what sorts of assurances should give rise to legal liability. Reliance alone is not sufficient. Weather forecasters
know and want people to use their forecasts in making their
plans, but they are not liable if they are wrong.
Posner as an academic gave no hint about how a court should
go about demarcating the realm of promissory estoppel. Moreover, in making a general observation about the coherence of promissory estoppel as a cause of action, Posner did not confront the
question of how to reconcile it with the technical rules of contract.
On the bench, however, Posner had to face these questions
repeatedly. To be sure, as a judge he was painting on a much
smaller canvas. Nearly all contracts cases that came to him as a
federal judge arose in diversity.27 He had to take the promissory
estoppel doctrine of Wisconsin, Illinois, and Indiana as he found
it. All of them embraced promissory estoppel, albeit in different
flavors. But what Posner could do (and did), even after taking the
peculiarities of each jurisdiction into account, was make sense of
these rules and impart order to them.

27 One exception is Miller v Taylor Insulation Co, 39 F3d 755 (7th Cir 1994), an
ERISA case in which federal common law is used to fill in gaps and promissory estoppel
is the relevant gap filler.
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II. PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND RISK ALLOCATION
In his various promissory estoppel opinions, Posner put hard
edges on the doctrine. Someone who pursues a promissory estoppel action must have relied on the promise. Some judges did not
take this element seriously. Indeed, reliance is hard to see in
Allegheny College v National Chautauqua County Bank of
Jamestown,28 one of the most prominent landmarks in promissory
estoppel jurisprudence.29 Posner, by contrast, insisted on reliance.
In one case, a company dismissed an employee and at the
same time promised to pay him through the end of the year.30 The
promise was not part of a bargained-for exchange. The employee
was properly terminated, and the company had no further obligation to him. And given the absence of any assertion that the discharged employees changed by virtue of the promise, promissory
estoppel did not lie either.31 Indeed, Posner found that asserting
on appeal that such a promise is legally enforceable was frivolous,
and he subjected those who made that argument to sanctions.32
Considerably harder than insisting on reliance is distinguishing between promises that are relied on that generate legal liability from statements of future intention that are relied on that do
not. A judge applying promissory estoppel must be careful in identifying what sorts of utterances qualify as a “promise” for purposes of promissory estoppel. In Posner’s view, it is not sufficient
that someone makes statements that are reasonably relied on.
The person being spoken to must reasonably understand that the
person doing the speaking is making a commitment to which she
can be held.33
28

246 NY 369 (1927).
Id at 373–75. Properly speaking, the case was not decided on the basis of promissory estoppel. Judge Benjamin Cardozo was able to find consideration on the part of a
college that received a pledge. But there is much dicta about promissory estoppel, and no
attention is paid in the course of this dicta to the fact that finding reliance under the facts
was no easier than finding consideration. No one has ever rivaled Judge Cardozo in his
ability to obfuscate and confuse in order to curry favor with the elites of the legal profession. And in Allegheny College, Judge Cardozo was at the height of his powers.
30 Colosi v Electri-Flex Co, 965 F2d 500 (7th Cir 1992).
31 Id at 504. Similarly, if a retired employee wanted to use promissory estoppel to
enforce the company’s promise to provide medical insurance, he had to show that, in the
absence of such a promise, he would have acquired insurance from some other source or
otherwise changed his conduct. Miller v Taylor Insulation Co, 39 F3d 755, 759 (7th Cir 1994).
32 Colosi, 965 F2d at 505.
33 In this respect, Judge Posner’s promissory estoppel opinions stand in distinct contrast to Justice Roger Traynor’s, which show no awareness of this question. See, for example, Drennan v Star Paving Co, 333 P2d 757, 760 (Cal 1958) (asserting that, because a
subcontractor both expected and wanted the general contractor to rely on the promise, it
29
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Consider the facts of Garwood Packaging, Inc v Allen & Co.34
Garwood made a food-packaging system that had, in Posner’s typically direct and forceful language, “flopped” in the marketplace.35
Garwood engaged Allen & Co to help it find new investors.
Martin, Allen’s point person, looked for such investors and found
some promising prospects. No one argued that a final deal was
ever consummated, and there were no undertakings definite
enough to create a traditional legally enforceable contract. But
this did not end the inquiry. Promissory estoppel does not require
the same degree of definiteness as a set of promises that are part
of a legally enforceable bargained-for exchange.
Martin had assured Garwood that Allen would put up half of
the needed capital if investors could be found for the other half.
On multiple occasions, he said that he would find the financing
Garwood needed. He told the principals at Garwood that he would
see that the deal went through “come hell or high water.”36 The
principals relied on these assurances. They forgave their personal
loans to Garwood. They moved from Indiana to Ohio to be closer
to a prospective partner that Martin had found. Posner accepted
the possibility that this reliance was reasonable.37 Taking actions
such as moving to Ohio improved prospects of closing a deal by
enough to justify the costs, even after discounting for the possibility that the deal might never close.
But Posner found that reliance alone was not enough.38 Someone can make assurances about her plans and intentions and reasonably foresee (and perhaps affirmatively desire) that these assurances lead to costly reliance. But this is not enough for legal
liability. Statements of future intention can be sufficiently qualified that they do not rise to the level of promises.
In another opinion, Posner used a series of hypotheticals to
unpack this idea.39 A father tells his son that he is thinking of
promising him on his next birthday that if he gives up smoking,
the father will restore him as a beneficiary under his will. The son
enrolls in an expensive cigarette addiction plan as a result. A contractor tells a subcontractor that he would consider him only if he
was “only fair” that the subcontractor should be bound in the event the general contractor
won the contract).
34 378 F3d 698 (7th Cir 2004).
35 Id at 701.
36 Id.
37 Id at 704–05.
38 Garwood, 378 F3d at 704.
39 See Cosgrove v Bartolotta, 150 F3d 729, 733 (7th Cir 1998).
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had more minority workers in his employ, and the subcontractor
goes out and hires some more. In both cases, reliance may be reasonable, but in neither case is there a cause of action for promissory estoppel. What is said is too qualified to count as a promise
even if it induces reasonable reliance.
Martin told the principals that he would see that the deal
would happen “come hell or high water.”40 But these words cannot
mean, as Posner put it, that Martin was promising that the deal
would go through even if Satan appeared or a tsunami obliterated
Ohio.41 Words have to be understood in context. Garwood’s principals were not unsophisticated rubes. One of them had been an
investment banker.42 Among such actors, Martin’s words fall
short of being a promise at all. Martin is merely announcing his
intention to do what he can to make the deal happen. He is not
promising any outcome. The principals might sensibly rely on this
statement, but they cannot hold Martin liable if the deal does not
happen.
But there are variations on Garwood that Posner does not
consider. What if, for example, Martin said he would make the
deal happen come hell or high water and then sat on his hands?
Is it a fair construction of his words to include an implicit promise
to use his best efforts to make the deal happen? Could the principals sue for a breach of that promise if Martin did nothing? Perhaps the better interpretation of Posner’s opinion in Garwood is
not that there was no promise but rather that none was broken.
Figuring out what counts as a “promise” and what counts as
“reasonable reliance” is far from straightforward. With respect to
both, it is an effort to provide one party with the incentive to engage in the optimal amount of communication and the other with
the incentive to engage in the optimal amount of reliance on the
communication. A judge who is too willing to find that something
rises to the level of being a full-fledged promise chills communication and induces overreliance.
Where other judges found implicit promises in order to invoke
promissory estoppel, Posner found implicit qualifications to promises that rendered them unenforceable.43 Posner justified doing
this with a rationale he employed elsewhere. The obligations that
the law implies have to reflect a sensible understanding of what
40
41
42
43

Garwood, 378 F3d at 701.
Id at 704.
Id.
See id.
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rational parties would undertake if there were explicit bargaining. Cases can arise in which there is a promise in a literal sense
and reasonable reliance on the part of the promisee, but it does
not make sense to find legal liability. Parties would qualify their
promises appropriately if they had the time to do so. Hence, it
makes sense to treat these promises as if these qualifications
were there.
ATA Airlines, Inc v Federal Express Corp44 is a case in which
a promise was made and may have been reasonably relied on, and
yet promissory estoppel did not lie.45 Federal Express, in exchange for promising to provide aircraft to the Department of
Defense in the event of an emergency, acquired rights to provide
nonemergency transportation for the government at favorable
rates. These rights were transferable, and ATA sought to acquire
a portion of Federal Express’s rights. Negotiations progressed sufficiently far that Federal Express wrote a letter in which it agreed
to transfer some of its rights to ATA.
Given the letter, Posner recognized, “there is no question that
there was a promise.”46 The letter left so many details open that
it was not sufficiently definite to be enforceable under traditional
contract law. Hence, he had to confront the question of whether
the promise was enforceable under a theory of promissory estoppel. The question for Posner was therefore whether “the promise
was (or could reasonably have been understood to be) intended to
induce, and could reasonably induce, reliance to the tune of $28
million.”47
Posner read into Federal Express’s promise implicit qualifications. As he explained:
If someone tells you “I promise you X, but don’t hold me to
it,” the promisor is making clear that he is not inviting reliance and the promisee cannot, by ignoring the warning and
relying on the promise to his detriment, make the promise
enforceable.48
Federal Express might not have explicitly said ATA could not
hold it liable for the promise, but it makes sense to treat its promise as if it had. “ATA could not reasonably have believed that

44
45
46
47
48

665 F3d 882 (7th Cir 2011).
Id at 888–89.
Id at 888.
Id.
Garwood, 665 F3d at 885.
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FedEx intended to commit itself to split the passenger business.”49
For this reason, “[s]uch a ‘promise’ may create an expectation but
does not create a commitment, and so the promisee relies at his
risk.”50
In importing such qualifications, Posner confronted the same
sort of challenges inherent in enforcing a traditional contract. The
judge must discover the “tacit agreement” between the parties. As
Justice Holmes explained, the extent of liability “should be
worked out on terms which it fairly may be presumed he would
have assented to if they had been presented to his mind.”51
Principal Mutual Life Insurance Co v Charter Barclay
Hospital, Inc52 is another case Posner approached in this fashion.53 An insurance company agreed to provide insurance to a
company’s full-time employees. The son of the company’s owners
enrolled in the plan, representing himself as a full-time employee.
When the son was admitted to a psychiatric hospital, the hospital
called the insurance company to verify that the son had enrolled
under the plan, and the insurance company affirmed that he had.
As Posner recounted, with characteristic vividness, it turned out
that the son did not work for the company. The son was instead
“a male stripper and pimp facing criminal charges for these activities.”54 The insurance company was therefore not obliged to cover
the costs of his hospitalization even though it told the hospital
that it would.
The question was whether the hospital could rely on the insurance company’s representation that the son was enrolled in the
plan and hold it liable. Posner found that the hospital could not:
As an experienced hospital operator, it is charged with knowing that insurers of employee benefit plans do not, upon receiving an application for coverage by a person claiming to be
an employee, conduct an in-depth investigation of the applicant’s entitlement to coverage and certify that entitlement in
answer to inquiries by medical providers. That would be
rather an absurd burden to place on the insurer, when we

49
50
51
52
53
54

Id (emphasis in original).
Id.
Globe Refining Co v Landa Cotton Oil Co, 190 US 540, 543 (1903).
81 F3d 53 (7th Cir 1996).
See id at 57.
Id at 55.
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reflect that the plan might cover hundreds or even thousands
of employees.55
But Posner may have made the case seem easier than it was.
To be sure, it is hard for the insurance company to know whether
those enrolled are in fact entitled to coverage. But it may be even
harder for the hospital. Someone has to bear the risk, and it is not
self-evident it should be the hospital rather than the insurance
company.
Three parties are involved: the employer, the insurance company, and the hospital. The policy is more valuable to the employer if the insurance company is obliged to reimburse hospitals
for a claim submitted by those who enroll, even if they later prove
ineligible. When the insurer is bound, the hospital will be able to
admit everyone enrolled under the plan. An employer should be
willing to pay more for such a policy. It wants its workers to be
able to receive medical care when they need it without having to
establish that they are entitled to receive the benefits.
If the employer, the hospital, and the insurance company
could bargain explicitly, would the insurance company assume
the risk that some of those who enrolled might not in fact be eligible? How does one assess whether the benefits of such a promise
are greater than the costs and that it is therefore sensible to read
into the insurance company’s assurances to the hospital its acceptance of the risk that someone enrolled under the plan is not
in fact eligible? Such gap filling is what judges must do with respect to ordinary contracts.
There are no magic formulas here, but Posner did identify
what matters. The problem of promissory estoppel requires fleshing out the allocation of risks that the parties would have made
for themselves had they confronted the subject explicitly. There
is not a traditional contract, but the fundamental problem is the
same as if there were.56 Legally enforceable promises are those in
which the addition of legal enforceability makes the parties
jointly better off. Far from signaling the death of contract, applying promissory estoppel requires engaging in the same enterprise.

55

Id at 57.
For Posner’s account of this task of gap filling in the context of an ordinary contract, see Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 Tex L
Rev 1581, 1605 (2004) (“[T]he best, the most cost-efficient, way to resolve [a] dispute . . .
is to use commercial or economic common sense to figure out how, in all likelihood, the
parties would have provided for the contingency that has arisen had they foreseen it.”).
56
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III. RECONCILING PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL WITH FORMAL RULES
To this point, I have not examined how Posner tried to reconcile promissory estoppel with the traditional rules of contract formation. The discrete legal question that arises most often is
whether promissory estoppel is still available when there is an
ordinary bargained-for exchange but the statute of frauds is not
satisfied. For example, this question is raised in Consolidation
Services, Inc v KeyBank National Association.57 Were Posner free
to answer this question as a matter of first impression, his opinions suggest that the traditional rules of contract law would
trump promissory estoppel:
Since the doctrine merely provides an alternative to consideration as a basis for enforcing a promise as a contract, it
would be anomalous to use it to take an oral promise out of
the domain of the statute of frauds.58
When confronting concrete questions such as whether promissory estoppel lies even when the statute of frauds would make
the promise unenforceable, a federal judge sitting in diversity
does not have a free hand. She must guess how the state’s highest
court would treat the case. But the judicial decisionmaking is not
entirely fettered. The highest court may not have faced the question, and even if it has, a federal judge sitting in diversity must
still decide how the rule of decision handed down by the state
court applies to the facts before her. Posner showed how a resort
to first principles was useful with respect to both tasks.
A good example came when Posner confronted Indiana’s
promissory estoppel regime. In Indiana, as elsewhere, a promisee
must do more than show simple reliance to avoid the statute of
frauds. In the language of the Second Restatement, the statute of
frauds prevents enforcement of the promise unless “injustice can
be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.”59 The task for the
57

185 F3d 817 (7th Cir 1999).
Id at 822. See also All-Tech Telecom, Inc v Amway Corp, 174 F3d 862, 869 (7th Cir
1999) (“When there is an express contract governing the relationship out of which the
promise emerged, and no issue of consideration, there is no gap in the remedial system for
promissory estoppel to fill.”).
59 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 139(1) (1981):
58

A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce
the action or forbearance is enforceable notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds
if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy
granted for breach is to be limited as justice requires.
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judge, including federal judges sitting in diversity, is to apply this
higher bar to the facts at hand.
Indiana’s formulation was somewhat different than that of
the Second Restatement, but it is cut from the same cloth:
[I]n order to establish an estoppel to remove the case from
the operation of the Statute of Frauds, the party must show
[ ] that the other party’s refusal to carry out the terms of the
agreement has resulted not merely in a denial of the rights
which the agreement was intended to confer, but the infliction of an unjust and unconscionable injury and loss.60
What is needed is some understanding of “unjust and unconscionable” that goes beyond, as Posner put it, “judicial indignation at
dishonorable behavior by promisors.”61 It is not an easy task. As
Posner explains, “To answer the question requires us to explore
the provenance of a phrase at once vague (what does ‘unjust and
unconscionable’ mean?) and redundant (how does ‘injury’ differ
from ‘loss’?).”62
One cannot simply assess the moral worthiness of the promisor’s behavior. As an ethical matter, people should keep their
promises, and from this, it is only a small step to say that justice
requires enforcing the promise in virtually every case. To make
sense of this doctrine, Posner grounded the doctrine in its
rationale.
This is again a familiar theme of Posner’s contract jurisprudence. With respect to any particular doctrine, one must first understand the purpose that the doctrine is serving and interpret it
accordingly. For example, when one party threatens to breach unless the other party, who has already sunk costs in performance,
renegotiates, the party who succumbs to the threat can call on the
doctrine of duress. To establish whether “duress” exists under any
particular set of facts, one must first understand why the doctrine
exists in the first place.
The formal grounds for refusing to recognize the renegotiated
deal is the absence of consideration to support the modifications,

For an example of a state court applying this test, see Kolkman v Roth, 656 NW2d 148,
156 (Iowa 2003).
60 Coca-Cola Co v Babyback’s International, Inc, 841 NE2d 557, 569 (Ind 2006), quoting Brown v Branch, 758 NE2d 48, 52 (Ind 2001). This formulation originates in Justice
Traynor’s opinion in Monarco v Lo Greco, 220 P2d 737, 741 (Cal 1950).
61 Classic Cheesecake Co v JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA, 546 F3d 839, 845 (7th Cir 2008).
62 Id at 842.
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but such a rule does a poor job of distinguishing between the coercive renegotiation and the one that arises because of changed
circumstances. Hence, in his opinions applying the doctrine of duress, Posner insisted that the judge should not engage in a mechanical search for consideration (not a straightforward process
in any event) but rather focus instead on the question of whether
the party forcing the renegotiating is taking advantage of a situational monopoly.63 The economic concept of “situational monopoly” fleshes out what “duress” means.64
In one of his best-known contracts opinions, Posner similarly
looked to underlying principles to understand the duty of good
faith each party to a contract owes the other.65 In Posner’s view,
the duty of good faith serves to “forbid the kinds of opportunistic
behavior that a mutually dependent, cooperative relationship
might enable in the absence of rule.”66 The duty is best understood
as embodying the set of “implied conditions necessitated by the
unpredictability of the future at the time the contract was
made.”67 It forbids opportunistic behavior and requires the cooperation that is essential to mutually beneficial trade.
One can contest how much good faith conceived in this fashion requires in any particular case.68 Nevertheless, at the very
least, the requirement that parties act in good faith prevents one
party from taking deliberate advantage of an oversight by the
other. If they had the time and the money, parties would write
contracts that prohibited every game of gotcha. Hence, it makes
sense to imply a general duty that has the same effect.
The “unjust and unconscionable” test for determining
whether promissory estoppel escapes from the statute of frauds
can be grounded in a similar fashion.69 To be sure, the task is not
the same. In the other cases, the task is implying terms to flesh
out a bargain that the parties have already reached. In assessing
the applicability of the statute of frauds to a promise seriously
63

See id at 846.
See Oxxford Clothes XX, Inc v Expeditors International of Washington, Inc, 127 F3d
574, 579 (7th Cir 1997). For a discussion of Judge Posner’s approach to the doctrine of duress,
see generally Douglas G. Baird, The Young Astronomers, 74 U Chi L Rev 1641 (2007).
65 See Market Street Associates Ltd Partnership v Frey, 941 F2d 588, 593 (7th Cir 1991).
66 Id at 595.
67 Id at 596.
68 Some have criticized Posner’s Market Street opinion on this ground, arguing that
the duties it puts in place are too narrow. See Todd D. Rakoff, Good Faith in Contract
Performance: Market Street Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Frey, 120 Harv L Rev 1187,
1195–96 (2007).
69 Babyback’s, 841 NE2d at 569.
64
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made and reasonably relied on, the question is the enforceability
of the promise in the first instance. Nevertheless, the interest
served, one of optimizing the value of promises that people make
to one another, is the same.
The statute of frauds applies when the stakes are large
enough that a court needs to be confident that a deal was in fact
struck and it will not mistakenly enforce a promise that was never
made.70 The heightened reliance requirement serves the same
purpose. Instead of asking about injustice in the abstract, the
court should ask whether there was “a kind or amount of reliance
unlikely to have been incurred had the plaintiff not had a goodfaith belief that he had been promised remuneration.”71 Given
that factfinding is inherently prone to error, it makes sense to
give parties an incentive to make the factfinder’s task easier. One
can, however, carve out exceptions when the costs of failing to enforce the agreement are high and the likelihood of error is sufficiently small.
Monarco v Lo Greco,72 the state law case that first allowed for
promissory estoppel in the context of a traditional contract rendered unenforceable by the statute of frauds, was particularly
compelling by this account. It involved a stepson who had worked
on a farm for two decades. He received only room and board and
spending money. The stepson asserted that he did this work in
reliance on his stepfather’s unwritten promise to pass it on to him
when the stepfather died.
Posner likened the stepson in Monarco to the travails of
Jacob at the hands of his uncle Laban.73 By contrast, the facts in
the case before him were altogether different. He faced a case in
which entrepreneurs sought a bank loan for their business. They
asserted that a bank officer promised them that their loan application would be approved, and they took a number of steps, such
as repaying defaulted student loans that the bank officer said
were necessary to have the loan approved by the higher-ups at
the bank.74
With respect to both the stepson and the entrepreneurs, there
were allegedly promises that were relied on. What distinguished
them was not that the stepfather behaved in a way that was more
70
71
72
73
74

See Lord, 9 Williston on Contracts § 21:1 (cited in note 23).
Classic Cheesecake, 546 F3d at 845.
220 P2d 737 (Cal 1950).
Classic Cheesecake, 546 F3d at 843–44.
Id at 840–41.
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reprehensible than the loan officer but rather that the stepson’s
reliance was utterly inconsistent with the stepfather never having made a promise, while the behavior of the entrepreneurs (taking steps such as paying off a defaulted loan and waiting a few
weeks for a decision) was not.75 Entrepreneurs take such steps all
the time in pursuit of bank loans even without promises being
made to them. The idea here, as elsewhere in Posner’s contracts
jurisprudence, is to start by identifying the inner logic of the common law rules themselves.
CONCLUSION
Each of Richard Posner’s promissory estoppel opinions made
only small, incremental steps. This is necessarily the case for a
judge who was interpreting the law of other sovereigns. But the
aggregate effect of these opinions put promissory estoppel in an
altogether different light than what Professor Gilmore presented
in The Death of Contract or what many other academics have offered since. As Judge Posner conceived it, the boundaries of promissory estoppel can be drawn. It does not consume all of traditional contract law. There are some cases in which promissory
estoppel claims prevail, but relatively few. Seen together,
Posner’s promissory estoppel opinions show the reach of the doctrine to be far less than Gilmore feared or mid-twentieth-century
contract scholars hoped. More importantly, they show how complicated, messy problems can be put in perspective by casting a
cold eye on them and figuring out what connects them to the cases
that have come before. Doing this, like the use of metaphor, offers
“intelligibility with the objective world.”76
It is a commonplace to point to the way in which microeconomics informed Posner’s judicial thought. Less often noted is the
other great influence on his intellectual development. Posner’s academic training before law school was not in economics but in literary criticism. Indeed, he devoted all of his last year of college to
a study of the late poems of W.B. Yeats. Posner found himself under the spell of a particular form of literary analysis known as
New Criticism.77 One of the giants of this school was Professor

75

See id at 844.
See Richard A. Posner, Yeats’ Late Poetry: A Critical Study (unpublished thesis,
Yale University, 1959), quoted in William Domnarski, Richard Posner 27 (Oxford 2016).
77 See Domnarski, Richard Posner at 26–29 (cited in note 76) (describing the influence of New Criticism on Judge Posner’s career).
76
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Cleanth Brooks, and it was under Brooks’s supervision that
Posner wrote his study of Yeats.
Before the New Critics, literary criticism focused heavily on
the cultural background in which works had been written. The
lives of the great poets and the literary environment in which they
wrote were the focal point. The New Critics believed that trying
to understand poetry by looking at the biographies of those who
created them was a mistake. It was, in the words of Professor
William K. Wimsatt, another dominant figure in Yale’s English
department, the “intentional fallacy.”78 Instead, the New Critics
claimed, literary criticism should begin and end with a hard look
at the poem itself and the way it is put together.
A successful poem was, in Brooks’s words, like a wellwrought urn.79 It had to be assessed on its own terms. Approaching the judicial enterprise with unflinching clarity and incisive
thought, the hallmark of Richard Posner’s work over the last four
decades, is very much in this spirit and explains to a great extent
why, in the clarity and insight that he brought to promissory estoppel and everything else he touched as a judge, Richard Posner
had no peers.

78 See W.K. Wimsatt Jr and M.C. Beardsley, The Intentional Fallacy, 54 Sewanee
Rev 468, 469 (1946) (“Judging a poem is like judging a pudding or a machine. One demands
that it work. It is only because an artifact works that we infer the intention of an artificer.”).
79 Cleanth Brooks, The Well Wrought Urn: Studies in the Structure of Poetry 19–20
(Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1947).

